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CLASSLESS AND UNCIVIL:  
THE THREE-DECADE LEGACY OF EVANS V. JEFF D. 
William H. Fedullo  
INTRODUCTION 
Blood was spilled to bring civil rights laws to the United States.  While 
the drafters of those laws might have worked from the relative safety of 
congressional offices, the people who created the political conditions 
necessary for that act of drafting to be possible put their bodies on the line 
for their conception of a more just and equal society.  From abolitionists 
taking up arms in Bleeding Kansas, to Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee activists risking brutal beatings to organize the march on Selma, 
to disability rights activists crawling up Capitol Hill to shame lawmakers into 
passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, great civil rights advances in our 
society have often been brought about by awesome acts of raw physical 
courage on the part of otherwise ordinary people.1  
It can be difficult to relate the heroism that brought us these laws to the 
fine points of their routine operation.  While standing in the shadow of that 
heroism, to worry about how private attorneys and litigants finance civil right 
lawsuits can seem entirely beside the point—or worse yet, mercenary.  But 
that shadow should not blind.  Civil rights fee-shifting, in which a losing civil 
rights defendant is made to pay the attorney’s fee for a civil rights plaintiff, 
has played a key role in making effective private enforcement of our civil 
rights laws economically feasible.  To understand how the physical courage 
of civil rights activists has—and has not—translated into material changes in 
 
  Executive Editor, Volume 21, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law; J.D., 2019, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2016, Swarthmore College.  I would like to thank 
Professor Stephen Burbank and Professor Tobias Wolff for their supremely helpful comments on a 
prior draft of this Comment.  Thank you also to the Editors and Board of the Journal.  Finally, thank 
you to my parents for their support, inspiration, and encouragement as I enter the legal field. 
 1 See John Craig Hammond, Slavery, Sovereignty, and Empires: North American Borderlands and the American 
Civil War, 1660-1860, 4 J. CIVIL WAR ERA 264, 286 (2014) (describing the war in Kansas); William 
J. Eaton, Disabled Persons Rally, Crawl up Capitol Step, L.A. TIMES (March 13, 1990), 
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the lives of aggrieved, marginalized people, one must look into the economics 
of private civil rights enforcement.  
For as long as the United States has contemplated civil rights laws, there 
have been controversies over whether and how those laws should be privately 
enforced.  During congressional debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
Representative James Beck (D-KY), as part of an impassioned, voluminous, 
and unabashedly racist denunciation of the bill, warned of the federal 
tyranny that would result if private parties were permitted to bring civil rights 
actions:  to allow federal courts jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought 
by private parties would be, Beck claimed, a “supreme folly” that would 
bring “local state government [to] an end” by making their “laws . . . a 
mockery and their courts a farce.”2  Latter-day critics of the civil rights 
enforcement regime tend to be less bombastic than Representative Beck, but 
questions about the propriety, efficacy, and social utility of the private right 
of action have persisted.  While in the 1960s, anti-regulation Republicans 
embraced private civil rights enforcement as a preferable alternative to the 
creation of a centralized civil rights bureaucracy, by the 1980s, conservative 
sentiments had shifted.3  The Reagan Administration complained that 
litigation authorized by the same statute Beck had criticized more than a 
century prior had “mushroomed” and “ballooned,” inconveniencing 
government and private business to an extent that necessitated the 
curtailment of the traditional prevailing party fee-shift, which had been 
extended to all civil rights cases through the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act.4  Reagan’s concerns have been occasionally echoed by 
more liberal voices: in 2016, Anderson Cooper reported on a supposed 
epidemic of frivolous, “drive-by” lawsuits arising under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.5  Private civil rights enforcement, in both substance and 
procedure, remains a live-fire ideological battlefield.  
This Comment will explore a corner of that battlefield: the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Evans v. Jeff D.6  Two things were at stake in Jeff D.: the 
ability of private civil rights attorneys to protect their statutorily authorized 
fees and, consequently, the efficacy of the private enforcement regime as a 
 
 2 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1871). 
 3 STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 9, 30 (2017). 
 4 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)); BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3, at 30.  
 5 60 Minutes: What’s A “Drive-by Lawsuit”? (CBS television broadcast Dec. 4, 2016), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-americans-with-disabilities-act-lawsuits-anderson-
cooper/.  In the report, a “drive-by” lawsuit was described as a low- or no-merit civil rights claim 
raised against a business with which the plaintiff never actually interacted. 
 6 475 U.S. 717 (1986).  
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whole.  In the case, Charles Johnson, a legal aid attorney, brought a civil 
rights class action suit against the Governor of Idaho and other state officials 
on behalf of institutionalized disabled children who had been denied access 
to adequate education or healthcare.7  The plaintiffs sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief and statutorily authorized attorney’s fees, but made no 
demand for money damages.8  The defense made a settlement offer that 
would have substantially granted the injunctive relief sought, but which was 
conditioned on the plaintiff accepting a waiver of statutory attorney’s fees.9  
Johnson, who had been appointed next friend for his clients, believed he had 
an ethical duty to accept the settlement, but filed a motion requesting that 
the district court refuse to approve the fee waiver.10  The district court denied 
Johnson’s request; on appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the fee 
waiver while leaving the rest of the settlement in place.11  Unfortunately for 
Johnson, the Supreme Court granted the Idaho defendants certiorari.  
Johnson’s predicament was hardly unique.  In the 1980s, statutory fee 
waiver offers were extremely common in the field of civil rights law.12  These 
offers put the attorneys who received them in a bind.  The attorneys, of 
course, could not ethically prevent their clients from accepting the settlement 
offers, no matter how unfavorable they might be to the attorneys’ interests.13  
But if the client did so, not only the attorney, but the civils rights bar in 
general, would be left in the lurch: the attorney would receive no payment 
for her services, and other attorneys, in fear of suffering the same fate, might 
be dissuaded from taking on civil rights cases in the future—especially those 
cases unlikely to produce substantial damage awards.14  If those attorneys 
turned away from civil rights litigation, the vitality of the civil rights private 
enforcement regime would be threatened. 
The Court did not find fears of the collapse of private civil rights 
enforcement persuasive.  Arguing instead that prohibiting fee waiver would 
actually hinder civil rights enforcements by “reducing the attractiveness of 
settlement,” the Court found that the practice did not undermine the policies 
of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act.15  The fee waiver offer had 
obtained legal legitimacy.  
 
 7 Id. at 720–21.  
 8 Id. at 721.  
 9 Id. at 722.  
 10 Id. at 720, 722–23.  
 11 Id. at 724.  
 12 See Josh Fitzhugh, Supreme Court Profile: To Win Your Case, Waive Your Fees, 71 A.B.A.  J. 44, 47 (1985) 
(claiming that fee waiver offers were made in over half of all civil rights cases).  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 732.  
1352 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
   
 
Regardless of fee waiver’s legal legitimacy, the propriety and social utility 
of fee waiver remains a live question.  This Comment will examine the 
history, effects, and normative value of the Jeff D. decision.  Part I explores 
the legal history that led to the Jeff D. ruling and examines the decision itself.  
Part II examines the actual empirical effects of the ruling, using the 
Integrated Database of the Federal Judicial Center to evaluate the case’s 
impact on new privately-brought federal civil rights filings and consent 
decrees, and concludes that the case brought about a collapse of the civil 
rights class action bar.  Part III examines ethical difficulties created by the 
ruling and argues that there are substantial ethical and philosophical reasons 
to reject the principle behind the ruling.  
I.   JEFF D. AND ITS HISTORY  
Fee-shifting in private attorney general civil rights suits—in which a 
private plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees at defendant’s expense in 
consideration for her efforts to vindicate a civil and hence inherently public 
right—has a venerable history in the United States.  Congress first 
authorized fee-shifting during the Reconstruction Era, in the Enforcement 
Act of 1870, which created “such allowance for counsel fees as the court shall 
deem just” for prevailing plaintiffs in voting rights cases.16  Early private 
attorney general actions were more hypothetical than actual, however.  The 
exigencies of Reconstruction and its aftermath—in particular, widespread 
racial terrorism against African Americans and the lack of sufficiently strong 
political structures to support plaintiffs in bringing claims and enforcing 
judgments—prevented the creation of a functional civil rights bar.17  Not 
until the 1950s did Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes see a substantial 
revival, when lawyers from the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People began regularly bringing actions under the Ku Klux Act,18 
which authorizes fee-shifting for cases involving the violation of 
constitutional rights under the color of law.19  Private civil rights lawsuits 
continued to grow in volume throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, aided in large 
part by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which favored private 
litigation over administrative enforcement actions.20   
 
 16 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 3, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870).  
 17  Paul J. Gardner, Private Enforcement of Constitutional Guarantees in the Ku Klux Act of 1871, 2 CONST. 
STUD., 81, 90 (2016).  
 18 Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Act), Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2012)).  
 19 Gardner, supra note 17, at 92.   
 20 See BURBANK & FARHANG supra note 3, at 30; infra Table I.   
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Though the Supreme Court eventually rejected the practice of judicial 
(but not statutory) imposition of civil rights fee-shifting in Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Company v. Wilderness Society,21 the private attorney general concept would 
prove to be an enduring feature of the American legal system, and, in 
particular, the civil rights enforcement regime.  A year after Alyeska, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.22  Congress, 
fearing that the Court’s decision in Aleyska had threatened the vitality of 
private enforcement of the civil rights laws by rendering fee-shifting 
“suddenly unavailable in the most fundamental civil rights cases,” explicitly 
extended the availability of prevailing party fee-shifting to a wide variety of 
civil rights actions.23  Congress believed that the Fees Act would “attract 
competent counsel to represent the victims of civil rights violations” by 
“creating economic incentives for lawyers to represent them.”24 
Against the threat of a burgeoning civil rights bar, defendants adopted 
innovative negotiation tactics to avoid large payouts and discourage the filing 
of subsequent civil rights claims.  One such tactic involved the exploitation 
of the differences in interest between civil rights attorneys and their clients.  
Specifically, civil rights defendants identified the statutory provision of 
attorney’s fees as a key point of potential attorney-client tension.  To exploit 
this tension, defendants would make settlement offers that decoupled 
attorney’s fees from the client’s relief on the merits.  In some cases, civil rights 
defendants would offer so-called “sweetheart” settlement offers—offers of 
attorney’s fees substantially in excess of what the civil rights attorney could 
reasonably expect to be awarded at trial, coupled with unreasonably limited 
substantial relief to the plaintiff.25  In other cases, defendants would make 
 
 21 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). 
 22 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)).   
 23 S. REP. NO. 94-1011 (1976).  
 24 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 751–52 (1986). 
 25 Neil M. Goldstein, Preserving Fee-Shifting After Evans v. Jeff D.: Joint Attorney/Client Control of Settlements, 
11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 267, 269 (1989) (discussing the practice of sweetheart offers).  The pre-Jeff D. 
repudiation of sweetheart offers is detailed in Daniel Nazer, Conflict and Solidarity: The Legacy of Evans 
v. Jeff D., 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 499, 502 (2004), which noted that several courts of appeal had 
banned the simultaneous negotiation of relief on the merits and fees, in the belief that such a 
prohibition would make sweetheart offers impossible.  See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 
1338, 1352–53 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that simultaneous negotiations of attorneys’ fees and 
substantive issues in class action settlements is strongly discouraged); Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 557 
F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977) (“A reasonable solution, we suggest, is for trial courts to insist upon 
settlement of the damage aspect of the case separately from the award of statutorily  authorized 
attorneys’ fees.”).  This Comment will not examine the effect that Jeff D. had on sweetheart offers.  
The availability of sweetheart offers post-Jeff D. is unlikely to have had a measurable impact on civil 
rights filings, because potential civil rights plaintiffs are not an organized profession, and would be 
unlikely to have a collective awareness of subtle changes in the civil rights litigation landscape. 
Perhaps one might argue that the proliferation of sweetheart offers could cause general reputational 
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settlement offers under which the plaintiff would substantially achieve their 
ends, but which were contingent on the waiver of statutory attorney’s fees.26  
This latter species of offer preyed on an attorney’s ethical duty to her client—
an attorney given such an offer would be obligated to present it to her client, 
and could not ethically prevent her client from accepting it.27  Unfortunately 
for civil rights attorneys, clients had little incentive not to accept the proposed 
relief.28  The attorneys had a duty to advance the interests of their client in 
substantive relief; the clients had no reciprocal duty to advance the interest 
of their attorneys in being paid for their services.29     
The benefits of making such fee waiver offers to civil rights defendants 
were two-fold: first, if accepted, the defendant would avoid paying a 
potentially substantial attorney’s fee to the other party; second, and perhaps 
more importantly, especially for an institutional defendant likely to face 
future civil rights litigation, the fee waiver offer disincentivized the bringing 
of future claims.30  Attorneys, uncertain of the prospect of seeing any return 
on their investment of time, energy, and money, even when successful in 
winning relief for their clients, would be less likely to bring a case in the 
future.31  This would be especially true in low-damages or injunctive-relief-
only cases, which were and are common in the civil rights context.32  
Attorneys who nonetheless took civil rights cases in the hopes of receiving 
their statutorily prescribed fee were assuming a risk significantly greater than 
that of an attorney taking a tort claim on contingency—the contingency fee 
attorney runs the risk of not getting paid if she loses her case; the civil rights 
attorney ran the risk of not being paid even if she secured a favorable 
 
damage to the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar among potential civil rights plaintiffs. However, this 
hypothesis is belied by the fact that low-income clients—a group disproportionately likely to be the 
victim of civil rights violations—have a generally positive view of lawyers from whom they seek 
assistance.  See HANNAH LIEBERMAN CONSULTING, LLC/JOHN A. TULL & ASSOCIATES, 
OVERCOMING BARRIERS THAT PREVENT LOW-INCOME PERSONS FROM RESOLVING CIVIL 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 47 (2011).  
 26 See Goldstein, supra note 25.  
 27 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2009), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/rule_1_4_communications/comment_on_rule_1_4/; Goldstein, supra note 
25, at 270. 
 28 See Goldstein, supra note 25.  
 29 See supra text accompanying note 25 (“On the one hand, attorneys fear that their assertion of a fee 
interest to reduce or block a settlement which is otherwise satisfactory to the plaintiffs may be 
unethical or may undermine their relationships with their clients.  On the other hand, if attorneys 
are unable to protect their reasonable fee interests, they may be discouraged from taking the very 
cases which Congress intended to promote by the fee-shifting statutes.”). 
 30 See supra text accompanying note 25.  
 31 See supra text accompanying note 25.  
 32     Peter H. Woodlin, Note, Fee Waivers and Civil Rights Settlement Offers: State Ethics Prohibitions after Evans 
v. Jeff D., 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (1987). 
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settlement for her client.33  This state of affairs was thought to pose an 
existential threat to the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar, and in particular, small, 
private civil rights practices.34  
 Throughout the 1980s, the fee-waiver offer increasingly became a de 
rigueur feature of defensive civil rights lawyering.  By 1985, approximately half 
of all civil rights cases involved such an offer at some stage of litigation.35  
While some state and local bar associations responded by declaring such 
offers to be ethical violations on the part of defense counsel, such prohibitions 
did little to soften the growth of fee waiver offers in practice.36 
It was against this background that Charles Johnson, a twenty-five year 
old, newly-barred attorney working for the Idaho Legal Aid Society, 
encountered a grave injustice in a state mental health facility.37  Mentally 
disabled children were being warehoused in state institutions, without 
receiving proper mental treatment or education.38  Johnson reacted with 
horror to the reality he observed in State Hospital South:  “I saw children as 
young as 11 years old institutionalized with adult mental patients, including 
some child molesters . . . . Maybe I had lived a sheltered life, but I thought 
the conditions I found there didn’t exist anywhere except in a Charles 
Dickens novel.”39  
In 1980, Johnson, still working for Idaho Legal Aid, brought a Section 
1983 class action against Idaho’s governor, alleging that the institutionalized 
children had suffered a deprivation of their constitutional rights.40  Johnson 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief for the class—specifically, that the 
institutionalized children be separated from the adult population, and that 
they receive adequate education and therapy—but advanced no claim for 
money damages.41  Johnson’s class action represented a paradigmatic 
example of the cases most vulnerable to fee waiver offers:  a case of indigent 
clients with no independent means to pay attorney’s fees advancing a claim 
for injunctive and declaratory relief only.  Unsurprisingly, it fell victim to the 
practice.  A week before trial, the defense offered settlement terms that would 
grant “virtually all” of the injunctive relief sought, in exchange for a waiver 
 
 33   Id. 
 34 See Goldstein, supra note 25. 
 35 See Fitzhugh, supra note 12.   
 36 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 37 See supra text accompanying note 12, at 45.  
 38 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 39 See supra text accompanying note 12.  
 40 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 41 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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of all claims to fees and costs.42  While Idaho Legal Aid opposed acceptance, 
Johnson, who had been appointed next friend of his clients and thus had sole 
authority to accept or reject settlements, felt ethically obligated to acquiesce 
to the substantively favorable offer.43  However, alleging that defense counsel 
had exploited his ethical duty to his clients, Johnson motioned the district 
court to use its power to review class action settlements44 to set aside the fee 
waiver and to give him leave to submit a bill of fees.45  While the district court 
rejected the ethics-based argument, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit sided with 
Johnson, striking down the settlement’s fee waiver while upholding its 
substantive terms and remanding the case with instructions to the district 
court to award reasonable attorney’s fees.46  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
fee waiver was contrary to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act; in 
order to comply with the act’s policies, settlement negotiations in civil rights 
class actions would have to be bifurcated into negotiations on the merits, and 
negotiations for fees.47  The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.  
The Court, in an 6-3 opinion written by Justice Stevens, rejected the 
Court of Appeals’ reasoning.  First, it rejected the notion that the district 
court had the power to modify the settlement in the way Johnson had 
requested—while the district court could accept or reject the settlement’s 
terms, it had no power to accept the relief offered on the merits while 
requiring the defendant to, against its wishes, pay attorney’s fees.48  It further 
reasoned that because Congress had, through the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act, intended for fees to go the prevailing party in litigation, the 
plaintiff, not the attorney, could dispose of the fees as she deemed fit.49  
Further, to allow fee waiver would not otherwise contravene the policies of 
the Fees Act—fee waiver would actually, the Court argued, promote the 
effective vindication of civil rights claims by making defendants more likely 
to settle or enter into consent decrees.50 
While the Court did not categorically forbid district courts from rejecting 
settlement terms based on their inclusion of fee waiver,51 it did confirm the 
 
 42 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 722 (1986). 
 43 Id.  
 44 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  
 45 Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 723.  
 46 Id. at 723–24.  
 47 Id. at 724–25.  
 48 Id. at 726. 
 49 Id. at 730.  
 50 Id. at 731. 
 51 Id. at 739–40 (holding that a state could not categorically refuse to enter into any civil rights 
settlement that included attorney’s fees, and that fee waiver terms based on a bad faith desire to 
dissuade counsel from bringing future cases ought to be rejected).  
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legitimacy of the fee waiver offer as a tool of defensive civil rights lawyering.   
For better or for worse, the practice of civil rights law had changed. 
II.  THE IMPACT OF JEFF D.  
Justice Stevens’ decision did not escape criticism.  While Justice Brennan 
remained optimistic that private attorney general suits would survive, he 
could not help but denounce the ruling as an attack on effective civil rights 
enforcement, writing in dissent, “[I]t does not require a sociological study to 
see that permitting fee waivers will make it more difficult for civil rights 
plaintiffs to obtain legal assistance.  It requires only common sense.”52  
Others spoke in more apocalyptic tones, with one scholar claiming, “Short 
of a swift reaction by Congress, the potential for a plaintiff to ever recover his 
attorney’s fees in future civil rights litigation is speculative.”53  Other writers, 
sharing Brennan’s fear that the rule of Jeff D., left unchecked, would have a 
deleterious impact on civil rights litigation, proposed a variety of mechanisms 
they believed could significantly soften its negative impact.54  But even the 
more optimistic of the contemporary commentators could not conceal a 
growing consensus that the Supreme Court, wittingly or not, had created a 
crisis that threatened the ability of private plaintiffs to effectively vindicate 
their rights recognized under civil right statutes.  
Controversy over Jeff D. was not limited to the pages of law journals.  
Congress, in a general rebuke to the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
on civil rights issues,55 passed new civil rights legislation that, among other 
things, amended the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act to include a 
ban on fee waiver offers.56  Under the bill, settlements, consent decrees, and 
 
 52 Id. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 53 Debra Watts McCormick, The Effect of Evans v. Jeff D. on Civil Rights Litigation, 12 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 415, 429 (1987).  
 54 See, e.g., Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Exception of Evans v. 
Jeff D., 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553, 554 (1987) (arguing that proper judicial policing of bad faith 
settlement offers could prevent abuse of fee waiver offers); Goldstein, supra note 25, at 272 
(proposing “properly limited joint control [of settlements] contracts” as a means to “promote the 
policies of both the fee-shifting statutes and the ethical codes”); Woodlin, supra note 32, at 1215 
(1987) (arguing that state and local ethics committees can and should bar defense attorneys from 
making fee waiver offers).  
 55 This rebuke was probably not intended specifically for the decision in Jeff D. Congress found that 
“in a series of recent decisions addressing employment discrimination claims under Federal law, the 
Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protections.” 
Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 2 (emphasis added). Congress may have been 
referring to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989) (requiring more stringent proof 
than mere statistical evidence of racial imbalance within a defendant’s workforce to make out a 
disparate impact claim under Title VII) and other employment discrimination cases, e.g. Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
 56 Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 9 (1990). 
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stipulations of dismissal would be ineffective, “unless the parties or their 
counsel attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all attorney’s 
fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.”57  However, the 
1990 Act did not become law, as the first President Bush vetoed the bill.58  
While concerns about fee waiver were not the thrust of President Bush’s 
objections—he primarily objected to provisions in the bill that he claimed 
would incentivize businesses to adopt racial quotas to avoid disparate impact 
discrimination liability—he did take time to criticize the fee waiver provisions 
in his veto message.59  His reasoning echoed that of Justice Stevens in the 
original Jeff D. decision; he argued that a ban on fee waiver would make more 
settlement in civil rights cases more difficult, and would further be a boon 
not to a deserving population of victims of civil rights violations, but to a 
supposedly selfish plaintiff’s bar.60  With that veto, legislative fee waiver 
reform died in Congress.  While Congress would pass the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, it excluded the fee waiver language, perhaps as a concession to 
overcome the threat of a second veto.61  The effects of Jeff D. would not be 
legislatively blunted.  We are still living with those effects today.  
Despite its deprecation at the hands of Justice Brennan, a little 
sociological study can do a lot to clarify what sort of effect Jeff D. really had 
on civil rights litigation—but it can also occlude that effect.  More recent 
scholarship tends to be somewhat equivocal about the question of what 
empirically provable effect Jeff D. had.  Professor Reingold, while adamant 
that it is “common knowledge within the plaintiffs’ bar” that Jeff D. brought 
about the “death of section 1983 [for plaintiffs with low-damage cases and 
for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief],” acknowledges the difficulty of proving 
this fact through statistical evidence.62  To understand the true effect of Jeff 
D., one must examine the relevant statistics in a more fine-grained manner 
than have previous commentators.  
 
 
 57 Id.  
 58 S. DOC. NO. 101-35, at 11 (1990), https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/ 
Messages/BushGHW/S2104-Sdoc-101-35.pdf. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. 
 61 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 62 Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 38 (2008); see also 
Nazer, supra note 25, at 500 (“[C]ommentators have claimed that Jeff D. will discourage attorneys 
from accepting civil rights cases and will cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to regularly miss out on collecting 
statutory attorney’s fees. Empirical research, however, suggests that Jeff D. did not have as dire an 
effect as was anticipated”). 
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A.  Methodology and Data  
To determine the effects of Jeff D., I examine the following categories of 
data: (1) the  annual number of new privately brought civil rights filings in 
federal district courts, (2) the annual number of new privately brought civil 
rights class action cases in federal district courts, and (3) the annual number 
of new consent decrees entered into in privately brought civil rights class 
action cases in federal district courts.  “Privately brought” here is defined to 
mean any action not initiated by the U.S. Government.  This language can 
prove slightly misleading, however, as any civil rights action brought by a 
state government in a federal district court would be treated as private.  
“Private” also does not distinguish between different kinds of plaintiff’s 
attorneys—it does not tell us if an attorney was working in private practice, 
or for the Legal Services Corporation, or for some other civil rights non-
profit.  
To find the overall number of new privately brought federal civil rights 
filings, I consulted the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts.63  The Reports contain information on 
the number of suits brought per year by type of action and by basis of 
jurisdiction.  To get an annual figure for privately-brought federal civil rights 
filings, for each year between 1970 and 2017, I added together the number 
of civil rights cases brought under U.S. defendant, federal question, and 
diversity jurisdictions.64  The Annual Reports classify civil rights cases 
brought by prisoners separately from all other civil rights cases; I chose to 
honor this convention, in large part due to the high volume of pro se prisoner 
petitions, the volume of which would be, presumably, unaffected by changes 
in rules regarding attorney’s fees.65 
To track the number of privately brought civil rights class actions, I used 
the Integrated Database of the Federal Judicial Center, which allows one to 
search civil filings from fiscal year 1970 to present.66  I refined my searches 
to include civil rights cases with class action allegations filed on the basis of 
 
 63 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, Table C-2 (1970–2017).  
 64 From 1970–2000, very, very few civil rights cases were brought under diversity jurisdiction.  See id. 
 65 For an examination of prisoner pro se actions, see Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se 
Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 14 (1998).  
 66 IDB Civil 1970-1987, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/interactive/IDB-civil-
1970-1987 (last visited May 1, 2019) (providing data from fiscal year 1970–1987); IDB Civil 1988-
present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/interactive/IDB-civil-since-1988 (last 
visited May 1, 2019) (providing data from fiscal year 1988 to present).  Prior to 1976, fiscal years 
began on July 1st of the calendar year before the fiscal year and end on June 30th of the calendar 
year that matches the fiscal year.  In order to promote consistency in the data set, July 1st and June 
30th were used as the starting and ending points, respectively, of all fiscal years.  
1360 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
   
 
U.S. defendant, federal question, and diversity jurisdictions per year.  I again 
excluded prisoner petitions.   
I also used the Integrated Database to find the number of new civil rights 
consent decrees.  I refined my searches to include civil rights cases filed on 
the basis of U.S. defendant, federal question, and diversity jurisdictions that 
were disposed through consent decrees per year.  Once again, I excluded 
prisoner petitions.  
I treat the critics and proponents of Jeff D. as making two distinct 
hypotheses.  The critic’s hypothesis is that, all other things being equal, the 
permissibility of fee waiver offers would cause new civil rights federal filings 
to fall by dissuading attorneys from taking on new civil rights cases.  The 
proponent’s hypothesis is that the permissibility of fee waiver offers would 
not cause new federal filings to fall, but would rather lead to a rise in the 
number of settlements.  
This data admittedly has limitations that may obscure our analysis of the 
effects of Jeff D.  First, it will obviously not pick up civil rights filings in state 
forums.  While there is no obvious reason to suspect that Jeff D. would have 
a different effect on federal claims in state forums than on federal claims in 
federal forums, the lack of state filing data is still a limitation on our analysis.  
On a related note, Jeff D. may have caused an uptick in the pursuit of state 
law civil rights remedies, as states are free to interpret their own fee-shifting 
statutes so as to forbid fee waiver.67 
 Second, the data set only begins to track pro se filings in FY 1988, which 
constitute a substantial percentage of all new federal filings.68  Further, the 
data available for pro se petitions in the years 1988 to 1995 is highly suspect, 
as the number of pro se filings reported is implausibly low, both for privately 
brought civil rights cases, and for all civil cases (in 1988, for example, the 
data set reports only 47 pro se cases of any type).  While data from the late 
1990s onward shows that pro se filings constitute a significant fraction of all 
privately brought civil rights claims, ranging from approximately a tenth in 
1998 to nearly a third in 2010, the data does not give us a sufficient basis to 
analyze the effect that Jeff D. had on pro se filings.  One would predict that 
pro se filing rates would presumably not be negatively affected by Jeff D., 
both because the threat of fee waiver is irrelevant to a party representing 
herself.  One might speculate that, if anything, Jeff D. would have actually 
increased civil rights pro se filings, as particularly perseverant plaintiffs, unable 
 
 67 See, e.g., Flannery v. Prentice, 28 P.3d 860, 862 (Cal. 2001) (holding that attorney’s fees awarded 
under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act belonged to the attorney); Woods v. Parker, 
901 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that attorney’s fees awarded under Tennessee’s 
anti-discrimination statute belonged to the attorney, not the plaintiff). 
 68 See Goldschmidt, supra note 65.  
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to secure an attorney, go forward with bringing civil rights claims on their 
own behalf.  
Third, while major civil rights statutes uniformly have fee-shifting, either 
through the Fees Act69 or through their own autonomous fee-shifting 
provisions,70 the provision of statutory attorney’s fees may be less important 
in certain categories of cases, namely those where substantial money 
damages are sought.  In such cases, attorneys and clients may enter into 
contingency fee agreements that would largely immunize the attorney from 
the harms associated with fee waiver offers.71  In particular, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), which allows for damages claims, may 
have spurred much of the growth in privately filed civil rights acts throughout 
the 1990s, as its damages provision may have, at times, lead to substantial 
verdicts and settlements.72  However, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed 
with the data used here, as the dataset does not separately track ADA claims 
prior to 2004.  If the ADA was the driving force behind the increase in civil 
rights in the first half of the 1990s, the apparent lenity with which judges 
treated ADA defendants may have caused the later decline in new filings; 
plaintiffs rarely prevailed in ADA cases brought to trial in the 1990s.73  
Finally, the data on consent decrees clearly does not tell us the full story 
of pre- and post-Jeff D. settlements.  The Integrated Database does allow for 
searches of cases that ended in settlement; however, it appears that this data 
was not accurately coded before the mid-1980s.  For fiscal year 1985, a 
 
 69 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).  The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act creates prevailing party fee-
shifting for actions arising under 34 U.S.C. § 12361 (concerning crimes of gender-based violence 
committed under color of law), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (concerning the right to contract and participate 
equally in the court system), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (concerning the right to acquire and dispose of 
property), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (concerning the deprivation under color of law of rights, privileges, and 
immunities guaranteed under the Constitution), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (concerning conspiracy to violate 
civil rights and obstruction of justice), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (concerning complicity liability for parties 
aware of conspiracy to violate civil rights or obstruct justice who, despite having power to do so, 
neglect or refuse to stop the conspiracy), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (concerning official acts that 
substantially burden the free exercise of religion), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (concerning land-use 
regulations that impede religious exercise), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (concerning discrimination in 
federally funded programs).  
 70 See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, § 216(b), 77 Stat. 56; Age Discrimination Act of 
1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6401(e)(1) (1979); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(2018).  
 71 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 85 (1990) (holding that contingent fee contracts are valid in 
Section 1988 cases, even if the contract would result in the attorney earning more than the statutory 
attorney’s fee).  
 72 See, e.g., Jury Verdict Round-Up: Year-to-Date Top 10 Employment Verdicts, LEXIS (2016), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/jvsubmission/b/adjudication/archive/2016/09/09/jury-verdict-
round-up-year-to-date-top-10-employment-verdicts.aspx (recording several multi-million-dollar 
ADA verdicts). Such verdicts are likely atypical.  
 73 Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 
99, 108 (1999) (finding that ADA defendants prevailed at a rate of 94% at trial through either 
dismissal, judgment, or verdict, and that defendants prevailed on appeal at a rate of 84%).  
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search for all cases of any type terminating in settlement yields only 13 results.  
It is not until 1988 that it shows a remotely plausible overall settlement 
number of 32,520 (which, while plausible, is likely incorrect).  As such, this 
Comment cannot examine the effect of Jeff D. on overall settlement rates.  
However, consent decree numbers can still be useful for this Comment’s 
purposes, because consent decrees often arise in litigation in which injunctive 
relief is sought.  If more consent decrees followed the Jeff D. decision, one 
might be forced to conclude that the Jeff D. majority’s contention that fee 
waiver promotes effective vindication of civil rights proved correct after all.  
However, the consent decree numbers provided by the Integrated Database 
prior to 1979 are implausibly low and thus suspect; those data points have 






































Chart 1: Privately Brought Civil Rights Cases Filed in Federal 
Court, 1970—2017
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Chart 3: Privately Brought Civil Rights Cases Terminating in 
Consent Decrees in Federal Court, 1970—2017
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B.  Analysis  
Looking only at overall privately-brought civil rights filings, one does not 
find the apocalyptic decline some of Jeff D.’s critics predicted.  Overall new 
annual private civil rights filings did decline after Jeff D.; however, that 
decline had begun after 1984, when new private civil rights filings reached 
their pre-Jeff D. peak of 20,889.74  Filings declined 3.0% in 1987 relative to 
1986 and 2.2% in 1988 relative to 1987.   When compared to the 9.5% 
decline in filings from 1984 to 1985, the supposed impact of Jeff D. seems 
relatively small.  While it is certainly possible that the threat of fee waiver 
offers had something to do with the post-1984 decline of civil rights filings—
after all, the fee waiver offer was not invented in 1986, but rather had played 
a prominent role in civil rights litigation for some time75—it is difficult to 
reconcile the reality of Jeff D. with the vision proffered by Justice Brennan 
and Professor Reingold.  Overall civil rights filings rallied significantly in the 
1990s, likely due to the passage of new civil rights bills, including the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
However, overall civil rights filings do not tell the full story of Jeff D.  The 
case immediately preceded a collapse in new private civil rights class action 
filings, a collapse from which the civil rights class action bar has yet to fully 
recover.76  While, prior to Jeff D. the number of civil rights class actions filed 
annually in federal court had been trending steadily downward from its peak 
of 2022 new cases in 1976, with an average 9.2% annual decline from 1977 
to 1986, the drop in new private filings after Jeff D. was nothing short of 
precipitous.  1987, the first fiscal year after the decision, saw 458 fewer new 
private civil rights class action filings than 1986, a 90.3% decline.77  Not until 
2003 did the civil rights class action filing rate reach pre-Jeff D. levels—and 
it did not stay there!  Despite the passage of new civil rights legislation in the 
1990s, including the Americans with Disabilities Act, since Jeff D. the annual 
filing rate for civil rights class actions has only equaled or exceeded the 1986 
filing rate in only four out of thirty years.78   
  The civil rights class action litigation rate did not rise at all with the 
overall civil rights filing rate.   
The critics of Jeff D. are further vindicated by the post-Jeff D. decline in 
civil rights consent decrees.79  The number of civil rights consent decrees 
entered into was at its highest in 1984 and 1986 (670 and 669 consent 
 
 74 See supra Table I and Chart 1.  
 75 Fitzhugh, supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 76 See supra Table I and Chart 2.  
 77 See supra Table I and Chart 2.   
 78 See supra Table I and Chart 2.  
 79 See supra Table I and Chart 3.  
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decrees, respectively).  That number declined by 25% in 1987 relative to 
1986, and by 33% in 1990 relative to 1989.  It never recovered to its pre-Jeff 
D. levels; in fact, as of 2017, it has declined 75% relative to its pre-Jeff D. 
figure—this, again, despite the proliferation of new civil rights statutes in the 
1990s.  This Comment does not claim that the decline was caused by Jeff D.; 
however, the decline nonetheless suggests that the supporters of fee waiver 
were mistaken in their arguments that Jeff D. would increase settlement. 
Ultimately, the data suggests that Jeff D. did have a negative effect on the 
willingness of attorneys to bring civil rights actions, but that that negative 
effect was smaller than its critics anticipated.  This Comment cannot 
authoritatively answer why the decline in civil rights filings was localized to 
class actions.  However, it can offer a few broad speculations in that direction. 
Attorneys may have found class actions a more dangerous prospect than 
other civil rights cases, due to worries about increased costs of litigation that 
they might not recoup.  Civil rights attorneys may have been confident that 
carefully written retainer agreements would be adequate to protect their fees 
in a non-class context.  But those same attorneys might have feared that 
judges would either treat those retainer agreements as unenforceable in class 
actions, or use their Rule 23(e) power over settlement to encourage fee-
waiver.  Finally, there might be other factors impacting civil rights class 
action litigation that go beyond the scope of this Comment.  Class action 
filings grew from 1982 to 1985, but in 1985 they were still only about a third 
of their peak in 1976.  While the immediate aftermath of Jeff D. saw a more 
dramatic percentage decline in filing than any other previous years, Jeff D. 
might be interpreted not as a uniquely cataclysmic event, but rather as a 
point in a longer process of civil rights class action decline.   
III.  PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL DIFFICULTIES OF JEFF D. 
Beyond the systemic effects that the threat of fee waiver offers has on 
filings in civil rights litigation, fee waiver offers engender unfairness and 
negatively affect the attorney-client relationship.  Additionally, civil rights 
defense attorneys may face potential ethical issues in making a settlement offer 
conditioned on fee-waiver.   
A.   Individual Unfairness  
Fee waiver offers are unfair to lawyers who receive them.  It is 
axiomatically true that civil rights policy-making should prioritize fairness for 
the victims of civil rights violations over fairness for their lawyers.  Indeed, it 
should even prioritize fairness for civil rights defendants over fairness for 
plaintiff’s lawyers (after all, defendants, as parties to litigation, have due 
process rights that attorneys lack).  The goals of this area of policy-making 
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should be to efficiently remedy past and present injustice, and to 
disincentivize the future practice of injustice.  However, the prioritization of 
fairness for actual parties to litigation need not cause the wholesale 
discounting of the value of fairness to lawyers themselves.  The fact that a 
rule causes obvious unfairness to lawyers engaged in litigation, especially 
when that rule does not clearly advance a legitimate countervailing interest 
for parties to litigation, is by itself a sufficient reason to at least re-consider 
the propriety of that rule.    
If one accepts the principles that a lawyer deserves reasonable 
compensation for her efforts in pursuit of a meritorious claim (especially 
when the vindication of that claim substantially promotes broader social 
goods), and that the prevailing party fee-shift is reasonable and proper in civil 
rights cases, one cannot deny that the rule of Jeff D. lends itself to significant 
unfairness.  The fact that a civil rights defendant makes a fee waiver offer in 
is itself a strong indicator that the civil rights attorney has done an effective 
job in building a case for her client.  This was the case in Jeff D. itself, as 
attorney Johnson had spent several years of his life investigating and 
advocating on the behalf of institutionalized children in Idaho.80  While the 
district court might not have been inclined to grant all the injunctive relief 
Johnson sought,81 Johnson’s case was strong enough that the defendants felt 
it was in their best interest to voluntarily incur the likely significant costs of 
paying for proper treatment for the institutionalized plaintiff class rather than 
risk going to trial.  Johnson, and attorneys like him, are left utterly in the 
lurch.  They have done a commendable service to the public by ensuring the 
effective enforcement of civil rights laws, but are left with nothing to show for 
it other than the warm feelings of their clients.  This is particularly pernicious 
for attorneys who eschew more remunerative fields of law in order to work 
in public interest.  Such attorneys have already made sacrifices to serve the 
public.  It is insulting to their dignity and injurious to their ability to perform 
that service to consider their labor as being worth so little. 
 Of course, one can conceive of instances where a fee waiver agreement 
might be more reasonable.  Cases that arrive in the attorney’s office in 
already relatively strong shape might be quickly and fairly resolved if an 
attorney is willing to forego her fee.  Indeed, this was the case for part of the 
controversy in Jeff D.—Johnson voluntarily waived his fee to quickly resolve 
the elements of the case related to education.82  However, such cases should 
not be enough to dismiss the unfairness of the Jeff D. rule.  In the absence of 
the case’s rule, reasonable attorneys could be expected (but not required) to 
 
 80 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 722 (1986). 
 81 Id. (noting that the substantive terms of defendant’s settlement offer were significantly better than 
what the district court had signaled it was likely to order at trial).  
 82 Id. 
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follow Johnson’s example and waive their fee.  Further, even if they are 
unwilling to do so, the statutory award of reasonable attorney’s fees suggests 
that the fees they would be entitled to would be relatively small.  Defendants 
would still be incentivized to settle such cases early in litigation, because the 
more quickly they resolved the case, the less they would pay in fees.  
Another difficulty appears in cases that are not strong but for which the 
injunctive relief or substantive damages sought are relatively inexpensive to 
defendant.  In such cases, defendants might be inclined to enter into a 
settlement only if the attorney agrees to a fee waiver.  If the attorney were able 
to refuse this offer, the client might lose their only opportunity for relief.  This 
case does seem like it could create some potential unfairness to the client—
losing what really might be their only opportunity for relief.  This is a genuine 
difficulty but is not strong enough to overcome the sense that the Jeff D. rule 
creates more unfairness for attorneys than it does fairness for clients.  
B.   Perversion of the Attorney-Client Relationship  
A further philosophical difficulty ought to be addressed.  The relationship 
that the threat of the fee waiver offer creates between public interest attorneys 
and their clients is antithetical to the ethos of public interest practice.  Public 
interest attorneys, if they want to protect their attorneys’ fees, can request or 
require that their clients sign retainers that waive their right to accept a fee 
waiver offer—that is, the client can assign the attorney’s fees to the 
attorney.83  The public interest attorney makes this request or demand 
knowing that their client, by agreeing, foregoes an important property 
interest.  The assignment of this interest, in at least some cases, might make 
favorable settlement on the merits more difficult.  This raises serious 
questions about informed consent.    
To explain why there might be a lack of informed consent for such 
retainer agreements, I offer my experiences working in the summer of 2017 
in the landlord-tenant housing unit of a non-profit legal services 
organization.  While my experiences are admittedly anecdotal, I believe they 
can offer insight into the daily effects of Jeff D. on the practice of public 
interest law.  One of my duties as a legal intern at the legal services 
organization was to interview prospective clients.  If I determined that these 
prospective clients fell within certain categories of need, I would have them 
sign a form retainer, and, additionally, an attorney’s fees addendum to the 
retainer, in which they assigned any attorney’s fees to which they might be 
entitled to the organization.  They additionally agreed not to accept an offer 
of settlement that included a fee waiver.  The prospective clients I saw were, 
 
 83 See, e.g., Zeisler v. Neese, 24 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that retainers that assign 
attorney’s fees to attorneys are enforceable in civil rights actions).  
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by and large, very unlikely to be in a position where they would be entitled 
to collect statutory attorney’s fees—the vast majority were defendants in 
eviction actions in Philadelphia Municipal Court.  However, while I never 
interviewed a client in such a case, the likelihood of encountering a 
potentially meritorious civil rights case in a landlord-tenant context is 
obviously high—racial discrimination in housing, while perhaps more subtle 
than it was decades ago, is still common.84  
While at the organization, I made no systematic effort to track my clients’ 
reaction to their retainer forms.  At the time, I was myself totally ignorant of 
Jeff D. and the threat of fee waiver offers.  But based on my best collections, 
I believe throughout my summer, I interviewed in the vicinity of eighty to 
one hundred potential clients, and accepted approximately forty to fifty for 
further assistance.85  Of those forty to fifty, I do not recall a single one who 
objected to the terms of the retainer agreement.  I think this is in large part 
because clients were not inclined to pay the terms very much attention.  
While I would give a general overview of the terms, and would offer to read 
through the retainer with client if so desired, I cannot recall a single instance 
where a client asked substantial questions regarding the retainer agreement.  
While a few would take the time to read it over, most would sign it after 
giving it only a few moments’ attention, if any.  Clients were generally 
interested in how to resolve their legal issue, and on how to get an attorney 
to represent them at their hearings.  They rarely—and understandably!—
expressed interest in the substance of the documents they were signing.  
Whether this was because the client trusted me and the organization to 
provide them with fair terms of representation, or because the client, fearing 
they would lose their one opportunity to find counsel, felt unable to bargain 
over the terms of representation, may have varied from case to case.86  But 
 
 84 See, e.g., Suzanne Gamboa, Study: Race Affects Home Buying, Renting, NBC 10 (June 12, 2013), 
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Study-Race-Affects-Home-Buying-Renting-
211136721.html (reporting on racial discrimination in the Philadelphia rental market); see also 
Caitlin McCabe, For Minorities, There’s Still Inequality in the Housing Market, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 
17, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/real_estate/residential/minority-
homeownership-black-homeowner-discriminatory-lending-zillow-barrier-renting-20171117.html 
(describing racial bias in the home-buyer’s market); N.Y. Times Editorial Board, The Race-Based 
Mortgage Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/opinion/mortage-minority-income.html (describing 
difficulties black home-buyers face in attaining a mortgage).  
 85 In most cases, this meant lobbying an attorney in the unit to agree to represent my client in an 
eviction; in other, non-eviction cases, I would only provide advice. Despite the stupendously high 
volume of new clients coming in daily, the incredible attorneys in my unit would almost invariably 
agree to represent my clients if it was at all within their power to do so.  
 86 Of course, while I was happy to answer any questions a client might pose about a retainer, it was 
not in my interest, or the organization’s interest, to overly encourage a long dialogue about the 
document.  Intake at legal services organizations, especially legal services organizations in large 
cities, can occur at a breakneck speed.  This was especially true in the landlord-tenant unit, which 
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one thing is clear to me in retrospect: the rule of Jeff D. was (unbeknownst to 
me, and likely unbeknownst to most, if not all, of the other law students and 
paralegals at the organization who did intake interviews) undermining the 
fairness of my relationship with clients.  
Beyond these philosophical difficulties lies a more practical question: to 
what degree are these retainer agreements enforceable?  These retainer 
agreements purport to cede a traditionally client-centered aspect of litigation 
to an attorney’s control.  Through the retainer, the attorney acquires the 
ability to prevent her client from entering into a settlement that contains a 
fee waiver, or at least to collect contractual damages against a settling client 
for breach of conduct.  This acquisition seems to run counter to the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which state that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”87  Courts tend to look with 
disfavor on attempts by counsel to settle or discontinue litigation contrary to 
client wishes,88 and some courts and state ethics committees have explicitly 
held that contractual provisions giving lawyers a right to control settlement 
are unethical or enforceable.89  However, it has been suggested that, even in 
states where attorney control of settlement is explicitly forbidden, an attorney 
may generally enter into retainer agreements whereby she acquires a right to 
pursue an action against her client if the client agrees to enter into a fee 
waiver settlement.90  However, this situation still poses practical and 
philosophical problems for both public interest attorneys and attorneys in 
private practice.  Practically speaking, collecting fees from civil rights 
plaintiffs may be difficult, as they may be judgment-proof.  Philosophically 
speaking, for a public interest attorney to pursue an action for recovery of 
 
was the highest-volume department in the organization.  On days when I was doing intake, I would 
often interview six or seven clients before lunch.  Unnecessarily extending these interviews was not 
something I particularly desired to do.  
 87 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N. 2002).   
 88 See, e.g., Estate of Falco v. Decker, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (“A client’s right to 
reject a settlement is absolute.”); In re Estate of Netzorg, 15 P.3d 926, 930 (Mont. 2000) (“It is . . . 
axiomatic . . . that a client has an absolute right to settle his or her case without the consent of 
counsel.”); Michael D. Tully Company, L.P.A. v. Dollney, 537 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1987) (holding that an attorney operating on a contingency fee basis could not compel a client to 
accept a reasonable settlement, even if non-acceptance would make it extremely unlikely that the 
lawyer would be compensated).  
 89 Lemmer v. Charney, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 502, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[A] clause in a retainer 
agreement between an attorney and his client prohibiting the client from settling his lawsuit without 
the consent of his attorney is void as against public policy.”); Jones v. Feiger, 903 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo. 
App. 1994) (“Any provision in an agreement to provide legal services that would deprive a client of 
the right to control settlement is unenforceable as against public policy”); CAL. COMM. ON PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY & CONDUCT, Formal Op. 136 (1994) (holding that, in a Section 1988 action, an 
attorney could not ethically require a client to sign a retainer agreement giving the attorney control 
over settlement).  
 90 See cases cited supra note 89. 
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fees against a client once again puts her in a position adverse both to the 
client’s interests and to the ethos of public interest practice.   
I do not mean to suggest that the organization for which I worked 
necessarily acts unethically in having clients sign those retainers.  Having 
clients sign such retainers provides a real benefit to the organization and its 
pursuit of justice, by blanketly immunizing itself from fee waivers.  This may 
be a legitimate solution to the ethical quandary caused by fee waiver offers.  
The point is rather that fee waiver creates a genuine ethical quandary.  The 
point of a legal services organization is to make accessible a legal system that 
often presents itself as a hostile, Kafkaesque obstacle course to marginalized 
people.  When an intake worker—even, in the best-case scenario, one 
equipped with better knowledge of Supreme Court case law than I had, and 
able to effectively communicate that knowledge—asks a client to sign over 
an important property interest, the legal services organization is undermining 
its own purpose.  It is making a demand (even when the waiver is phrased as 
a request, practically speaking, for reasons discussed above, it is probably 
heard as a demand) of a marginalized person, a demand they practically 
cannot refuse.  The legal services organization, even if it acts in the wider 
interests of utilitarian justice, is in this small way, making itself part of the 
great hostile byzantine legal complex the marginalized person has been 
confronting their whole life.  Jeff D. forces the legal services organization into 
this philosophically uncomfortable position.  
C.   The Ethics of Making Fee Waiver Offers  
Finally, a defense attorney may face ethical difficulties in making a fee 
waiver offer. Before the Jeff D. decision, the ethics committees of several state 
and local bar associations weighed in on the matter of fee waiver.  Their 
conclusions varied: some committees found that simultaneous negotiations 
of substantive relief and fees was itself unethical; some found that lump sum 
offers were ethical, but that demands for a complete waiver of attorney’s fees 
was not; and others found there to be no ethical issue with the fee waiver.91  
The reasoning behind the restrictive ethical rules rested in the defense 
attorney’s supposed duty to ensure the effective enforcement of our civil 
rights laws.92  By taking steps that would systemically undermine the ability 
of civil rights plaintiffs to bring actions in the future, the defense attorney, the 
 
 91 See Robert Hewitt Pate, Evans v. Jeff D. and the Proper Scope of State Ethics Decisions, 73 VA. L. REV. 
783, 795–96 (1987) (noting that the bar association of the City of New York had taken the strictest 
anti-fee waiver stance, that the bar associations of the District of Columbia and Georgia had taken 
the middle ground, and that the bar associations of Connecticut, Virginia, and New Mexico had 
taken the least restrictive stance).  
 92 Id.  
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reasoning goes, is not merely playing hard ball at the negotiating table, but 
is maliciously attacking access to justice.93   
Views differ on the legality of state ethics committees regulating fee 
waiver.94  Regardless of the legality of such bans, the reasoning behind ethics 
bans on fee waivers seems to overstep the authority of bar association ethics 
committees.  Fee waiver ethics rules effectively regulate not just the conduct 
of the attorney, but the conduct of the defendant.  Under these rules, the 
defendant, who has the right to seek a settlement with fee waiver, finds itself 
governed by an ethics committee that has no rightful jurisdiction over it.  
Further, the interest being regulated here is not the defense attorney’s, but 
rather her client’s.  The moneys that would go to the plaintiff’s attorney 
belong to the defendant, not the defendant’s attorney.  The defense attorney 
does not really garner any direct benefit from making the fee waiver offer.  If 
anything, the systematic effect of fee waiver is contrary to the defense 
attorney’s pecuniary interest, because, while she may be hesitant to admit it, 
her livelihood is dependent on the willingness of entrepreneurial plaintiff’s 
attorneys to bring future actions.  In holding fee waiver offers to be unethical, 
state bar associations attempt to act as a surrogate legislature, regulating non-
attorney conduct.  While the rule of Jeff D. may create unsavory ethical 
scenarios for plaintiff’s lawyers, to impose an ethical constraint on the defense 
attorney is really to impose an ethical constraint on the defendant.  
CONCLUSION  
More than thirty years after the decision, Jeff D. and its aftermath may 
seem to be of merely historical interest.  The threat of fee waiver has become 
simply part of the background of the civil rights enforcement landscape.  
Perhaps we might be curious about how we arrived at this state of affairs, but 
this state of affairs is no longer political.  We might talk about how civil rights 
attorneys approach the rule of Jeff D.—their use of creative retainers, their 
attempts to educate their clients—we might even bemoan the rule as deeply 
unjust, but we no longer talk about what is to be done about the rule.  The 
issue is not a live one.  
A deep flaw runs through this way of thinking.  The unjustness of a rule 
is not undone because it has been in place for three decades.  An unjust rule 
can be circumvented, it can be undermined, it can even be criticized—but, 
most crucially, it can be undone.  
 
 93 Id. 
 94 See Hewitt Pate, supra note 91, at 795–96 (1987) (arguing that state ethical regulation of fee waiver 
violates the supremacy clause); Woodlin, supra note 54, at 1215 (arguing that state and local ethics 
committees can and should bar defense attorneys from making fee waiver offers).  
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The civil rights problems of our day have been eloquently articulated.95  
While their solutions do not lie solely in the courtroom, effective private 
enforcement of our civil rights laws remains a necessity in addressing them.  
Undoing Jeff D. would improve the access of victims of civil rights violations 
to effective advocates and hence effective remedies.  It could revitalize the 
civil rights class action bar by increasing the viability of low-damage and no-
damage claims.  It would abolish the unfairness inherent to denying a fee to 
an attorney who has spent time, energy, and money building a strong case 
on behalf of her client.  Finally, it would dispense with the awkward 
philosophical unseemliness of a legal services organization requesting or 
demanding that a prospective client assign to it an important property 
interest.  Congress ought to act and implement the language it first 
considered in the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990.  
  
 
 95 See, e.g., TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015) (presenting a poignant 
account of a black man’s encounters with systemic racism, including police brutality and murder); 
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW (2017) (highlighting the role consciously racist public 
policy played in creating still extant segregation in housing); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The First White 
President, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-white-president-ta-nehisi-
coates/537909/ (“To Trump, whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic but is the very core of his 
power. In this, Trump is not singular. But whereas his forebears carried whiteness like an ancestral 
talisman, Trump cracked the glowing amulet open, releasing its eldritch energies”); Vann R. 
Newkirk II, What’s Missing from Reports on Alabama’s Black Turnout, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/can-doug-jones-get-enough-black-
voters-to-win/547574/ (describing voter suppression efforts against black voters in Alabama); 
Richard Perez-Peña, White Supremacists Were Ready for Violence in Charlottesville. The Police Were Not, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/charlottesville-white-
supremacist-rally.html (describing private white supremacist violence at the “Unite the Right” rally 
in Charlottesville, Virginia).  
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APPENDIX 







































1970 3,586 n/a 86 n/a 46 n/a 
1971 4,609 + 28.5% 210 + 144.2% 10 n/a 
1972 5,482 + 18.9% 457 + 117.6% 0 n/a 
1973 6,691 + 22.1% 1,085 + 137.4% 0 n/a 
1974 7,294 + 7.7% 1,321 + 21.7% 0 n/a 
1975 9,037 + 25.4% 1,626 + 23.1% 0 n/a 
1976 10,585 + 17.1% 2,022 + 24.4% 0 n/a 
1977 11,329 + 7.0% 1,878 - 8.9% 2 n/a 
1978 11,301 - 0.2% 1,522 - 19.0% 2 n/a 
1979 11,656 + 3.1% 1,158 - 23.9% 559 n/a 
1980 11,485 - 14.7% 806 - 30.4% 581 + 3.9% 
1981 13,534 + 17.8% 776 - 3.7% 650 + 11.9% 
1982 16,144 + 19.3% 544 - 29.9% 648 - 0.3% 
1983 17,798 + 10.2% 436 - 19.5% 629 - 2.9% 
1984 19,299 + 8.4% 555 + 27.3% 670 + 6.5% 
1985 17,472 - 9.5% 670 + 20.7% 608 - 9.2% 
1986 17,872 + 2.3% 507 - 24.3% 669 + 10.0% 
1987 17,342 - 3.0% 49 - 90.3% 500 - 25.3% 
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1988 16,966 - 2.2% 244 + 398.0% 548 + 9.6% 
1989 16,950 - 0.1% 125 - 48.8% 413 - 24.6% 
1990 16,310 - 3.8% 113 - 9.6% 280 - 32.2% 
1991 16,992 + 4.2% 82 - 27.4% 286 + 2.1% 
1992 21,821 + 28.4 226 + 175.6% 319 + 11.5% 
1993 23,109 + 5.9 92 - 59.3% 284 - 11.0% 
1994 27,335 + 18.3% 161 + 75.0% 224 - 21.1% 
1995 31,627 + 15.7% 152 - 5.6% 240 + 7.1% 
1996 35,726 + 13.0% 143 - 5.9% 206 -14.2% 
1997 40,026 + 12.0% 156 + 9.1% 203 - 1.5% 
1998 40,205 + 0.4% 168 + 7.7% 206 + 1.5% 
1999 37,646 - 6.4% 163 - 3.0% 217 + 5.3% 
2000 38,446 + 2.7% 199 + 22.1% 218 + 0.5% 
2001 37,067 - 3.6% 273 + 37.2% 199 - 8.7% 
2002 37,541 + 1.3% 327 + 19.8% 197 + 1.0% 
2003 37,814 + 0.7% 512 + 57.1% 211 + 7.1% 
2004 38,845 + 2.7% 435 - 15.0% 222 + 5.2% 
2005 35,364 - 9.0% 512 + 17.7% 235 + 5.9% 
2006 33,296 - 5.8% 383 + 25.2 194 - 17.4% 
2007 29,814 - 10.5% 329 - 14.1% 190 - 2.1% 
2008 29,124 - 2.3% 230 - 30.1% 195 + 2.6% 
2009 30,699 + 5.4% 153 - 33.5% 182 - 6.7% 
2010 32,125 + 4.6% 230 + 50.3% 144 - 20.9% 
2011 34,671 + 7.9% 275 + 19.6% 144 0% 
2012 35,572 + 2.6% 286 + 4.0% 189 + 31.3% 
2013 35,048 - 1.5% 432 + 51.0% 186 - 1.6% 
2014 33,153 - 5.4% 441 + 2.1% 145 - 22.0% 
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2015 35,312 + 6.5% 435 - 1.4% 178 + 18.5% 
2016 35,658 + 1.0% 513 + 17.9% 177 + 0.6% 
2017 36,407 + 2.1% 518 + 1.0% 167 - 5.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
